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Old Principles and New Realities: Measuring Army Effectiveness in Operation Uphold Democracy

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This chapter attempts to measure the effectiveness of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy and the transition to the follow-on UN Mission in Haiti. In addressing this subject, it is good to take account of the words of former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell, in the first edition of the new series of joint doctrine manuals, Joint Pub 1, where he articulates the premise that the modern American way of war is joint warfare. Thus, in Powell's view, the U.S. Army never again will go to war alone; it will always be part of a joint team. And if Operation Uphold Democracy is indeed a harbinger of the future, then the Army in the future will almost invariably participate only as a member of a joint, interagency, and multinational team!

This chapter will consider each of the sequential phases of the operation according to how well or poorly it was executed in terms of standardized principles of U.S. Army and joint doctrine as exemplified in both the nine principles of war and the six principles of military operations other than war (MOOTW).[1] There is significant overlap between the two sets of principles in relation to three of the principles: objective and security, in which the overlap is complete, and unity of command, where that term becomes a subset of the principle of unity of effort. The remaining principles of war are offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, surprise, and simplicity; while those of MOOTW are legitimacy,[2] perseverance, and restraint.

Using the principles of war and MOOTW as criteria for determining the degree of success of the "intervasion" of Haiti does not imply that all of these principles were specified by the commanders and their staffs in planning and executing the operation. The principles of war and MOOTW are neither gospel nor dogma. Rather, in the case of Haiti, the principles provided an intellectual underpinning for the operation that was implicit in nature, in some cases, but explicit in others, as in UNMIH commander Major General Joseph Kinzer's statement of intent. U.S. Army officers are nurtured on FM 100-5, *Operations*,

which addresses both sets of principles directly and is part of the intellectual baggage that officers bring to war and warlike operations.

Operation Uphold Democracy can be divided into five phases for analytical purposes: (1) planning, (2) deployment, (3) employment, (4) transition,[3] and (5) redeployment. These phases will be analyzed in respect to their application to the principles of war and MOOTW. Four possible outcomes of the analysis are contemplated. First, the principle was applied successfully during a particular phase. Second, it was either not applied or applied in inappropriate ways that resulted in failure. Third, the application of the principle by the force was to varying degrees appropriate or not, which resulted in a mixed outcome. Fourth, the principle in question was not applicable to a particular phase of the operation.

Planning

With few exceptions, the principle of the objective was well applied during the planning phase of Operation Uphold Democracy. The objective was stated clearly in the several UN Security Council resolutions on Haiti. These required the restoration to office of the democratically elected president of Haiti, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, and the removal of the military junta that had replaced him. The conditions required to permit the return of President Aristide were also the conditions necessary to turn the mission over to the UN, that is, the creation of a secure and stable environment in Haiti. The specific terms of such an environment, however, were never clearly articulated or elaborated as an end state at the strategic level. This failing was more than adequately addressed on the ground, however, at the operational level. Nevertheless, restoring democracy and establishing "a secure and stable environment," in the words of the Carter-Cedras agreement, left some early confusion at the tactical level. Long-term security and stability were linked to the political objective of restoring democracy, which, while never clearly defined, generally seemed to imply the return of the democratically elected president to office and the holding of a series of subsequent free and fair elections that would culminate in the election and inauguration of a new president.

In the planning process, the objective of the offensive was well and fully served by a U.S. Army that is nothing today if not offensive minded. Hence, the concept of OPLAN 2370 was offensive violence inflicted suddenly, from sky and sea, with overwhelming but appropriate force. OPLAN 2380, by contrast, was developed for a

permissive entry but still sought to land large numbers of well-armed troops in an offensive and combat-ready posture. OPLAN 2375 took a position somewhere in between, and when it was further modified and executed as 2380–Plus, it retained the offensive capabilities inherent in OPLANs 2370 and 2380. The one planning failure was in clarifying the rules of engagement for 2380–Plus before the operation was executed. Although not a planning failure per se, no one even considered the possibility that 2370 would be aborted even as it was being executed!

Mass was the certain complement to the offensive in all the plans. It was clear from the beginning of the planning that a large number of forces were going to have to be landed in Haiti expeditiously, after which they would quickly make their presence and power felt in the two centers of gravity in the country, Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien. This was built into all versions of the several plans. The mirror image of mass is economy of force. Here, the planners' record was mixed. With respect to U.S. forces, the plans called for the use of Special Operations Forces in an economy of force role, occupying the towns and villages of the hinterland. Operation Uphold Democracy was never a unilateral American operation; all plans called for multinational elements, to be led by the CARICOM battalion, either to enter with the U.S. forces in a permissive environment or to act as follow-on forces after a forcible entry. In no case, however, did the plans address in detail how the CARICOM contingent was to be employed.[4] In addition, military planning appears not to have taken into account either additional multinational forces or the follow-on UN mission force, even though this was specified in UNSCR 940.[5] In short, as the planners moved from a U.S.-only military operation to a multinational one, and one that involved interagency players, the planning became less and less complete. Even though Operation Uphold Democracy was the first-ever case of interagency political-military planning directly linked to a military operation, it failed to mass the interagency forces effectively and achieve synergy with the committed military units. This was largely because several of the interagency actors failed to develop the parts of the plan they had agreed to draft. The planners, moreover, did not plan completely through the entire campaign to redeployment.

The above discussion leads directly to consideration of the principles of unity of command and unity of effort. As suggested above, the planners left multinational and interagency operations to be considered in detail later or elsewhere. Although planning for Uphold Democracy included an interagency plan for the first time in any

modern operation, it was in no way comparable in quality to the joint OPLANS.[6] Nor was it entirely integrated with those plans. There were numerous problems in the joint planning as well, especially in the integration of OPLAN 2380 with 2370. The latter was the product of the XVIII Airborne Corps in its role as JTF 180, while 2380 was being developed by the 10th Mountain Division as JTF 190. The division staff, however, was insufficient in numbers and experience to command and control a JTF without augmentation, let alone plan for one, and the augmentation was less than instantaneous in arriving and in achieving full integration. In addition, much of the combat support and combat service support planning was in the hands of the same planners who were developing plans for JTF 180 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. As Walter Kretchik makes clear, this entailed many flights back and forth between Forts Bragg and Drum, with some degradation of the planning effort due to lost time, compartmentalization, and sheer fatigue.[7] Furthermore, all the plans assumed that the 10th Mountain Division would be JTF 190 for the duration. At no time was the 25th Infantry Division mentioned in the plans.

All the plans stressed security of the force in two senses. First, security of the force was developed in terms of force protection and ROE. Second, the mandate for Uphold Democracy and the Multinational Force dictated that the mission would be complete "when a secure and stable environment has been established and UNMIH has adequate force capability and structure to assume the full range of its functions . . . "[8]

The American military is perhaps the most maneuver-dependent force in the world at the strategic and operational levels. Maneuver, as used here, refers not only to the process of moving forces but, even more important, to that of gaining relative advantage over the adversary. At the strategic level, the CINC, USACOM, chose to enhance his maneuver capability by making use of the adaptive joint force packages he had been experimenting with over the previous two years. As a result, Army helicopters were positioned on the carriers USS *America* and *Eisenhower* for SOF and 10th Mountain Division forces respectively. This innovative use of the carriers significantly enhanced the flexibility of the JTFs at the strategic and operational level and permitted a much more rapid transition from a forced-entry plan (2370) to the revised "permissive-entry" plan (2380–Plus).

This maneuver capability was used in an attempt to ensure operational and tactical surprise. Still, with the deliberate sacrificing of strategic surprise for good and sufficient political reasons (the United

States hoped that the demonstration of what it was capable of doing would result in a negotiated departure of the Haitian junta and the return of President Aristide), maintaining secrecy at the operational and tactical levels of the operation was highly problematic. In fact, it was the discovery of the departure of forces from Pope AFB and the report of it to General Biamby during the Carter negotiations that nearly derailed the settlement when the Haitian principals abruptly fled the negotiations only to be re-engaged after Mrs. Cedras told the delegation how to find her husband. In turn, the evidence that the United States was prepared to use whatever force was required finally ensured that the settlement was accepted.[9]

The plans for the forced-entry operation were in no way simple in execution. Where the overall concept was quite simple—seize Port-au-Prince by airborne assault and Cap Haitien by amphibious landing at night, with forces spreading out over the entire country the next day—the air operations around the capital were extraordinarily complex. At one time, there were to be some 300 aircraft, all operating within the same confined airspace—a nightmare for air traffic control. This expedient did not violate the principle of simplicity; the operation was simple in conception, but it was complex in execution, requiring that special attention be given to control measures—the most important measure of which was rehearsal—designed to deconflict actual operations.

The final principle to be considered in the planning phase is the single most important principle in MOOTW—legitimacy. At the international level, legitimacy was granted by UNSCR 940. In Haiti, the planners concluded that legitimacy would be gained by the restoration of the elected president, Aristide, and the dismemberment of the hated FAd'H and its auxiliaries, variously known as attachés or simply *macoutes.*[10] As it happened, the actual circumstances of Operation Uphold Democracy—the creation and execution of 2380–Plus upon the aborting of 2370 in the midst of execution—determined that the elimination of the FAd'H and its auxiliaries would not happen as rapidly or with the degree of ruthlessness desired by much of the public. The accomplishment of this particular aspect of legitimacy was further impeded by the initial confusion over the proper ROE and the lack of assertiveness by the 10th Mountain Division in and around Port-au-Prince. Finally, the operation would gain legitimacy in the United States if American casualties were limited, if Haitian-on-Haitian violence subsided, and if the illegal waves of Haitian migration to the United State ended.

Deployment

The deployment phase of the operation began as soon as the president, through the secretary of defense, issued the warning order to execute OPLAN 2370. With the exception of airborne units, the forces required for Operation Uphold Democracy began to deploy by land to their embarkation stations upon receipt of the warning order. The paratroopers would not begin deployment until the execute order was issued a few days later.

The principle of the objective was adhered to scrupulously in the deployment phase. The strategic objective of restoring democracy (not carefully defined, as noted in the previous section) depended completely on the successful attainment of the operational objective of the mission. It was clearly stated in all the plans and, indeed, remained the same no matter which plan was executed. In essence, the operational objective was to establish a stable and secure environment in Haiti for the return of the democratically elected president to office. At the operational and tactical level, securing this objective meant taking control of the two principal cities of the nation, Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien, which were identified as centers of gravity. The deployment from Fort Bragg by air and Norfolk by sea aimed at seizing control of the centers of gravity in a swiftly executed *coup de main.* With the two cities in U.S. hands, SOF forces would move into the rest of the country and establish control.

Mass also was essential to all plans. OPLAN 2370 put SOF and the 82d Airborne Division into Port-au-Prince concurrently with the Special Marine Air-Ground Task Force's (MAGTF) arrival at Cap Haitien. Immediate follow-on would involve the landing of 10th Mountain Division forces from the USS *Eisenhower* by helicopter. These forces were more than sufficient to overwhelm the FAd'H. Once the execute order was given, airborne forces began to deploy, and the ships carrying the command and control elements, the Special MAGTF, and the 10th Mountain moved into assault position. Forces were, thus, effectively massed for the execution of OPLAN 2370 (or any variation of 2370 or 2380, should that be necessary).

All plans designated that economy of force would be achieved by SOF, and those forces were deployed to control the Haitian countryside. Strategic maneuver was the essence of the deployment phase. Generally, the deployment went like clockwork, by sea and air. Operational and tactical maneuver, however, does not become relevant until the employment phase. Deploying the force has been extremely

well developed in the Joint Operational Planning and Execution System (JOPES) and well practiced by U.S. military forces over many years, including Panama in 1989, Operation Desert Shield in 1990, and Somalia in 1992. Thus, while there were some innovative refinements to the deployment system, such as the CINCUSACOM's use of carriers as the base for his adaptive joint force packages, these only incrementally stressed the strategic maneuver system.

For the deployment phase of the operation, the principle of unity of command clearly took precedence over its twin, unity of effort. Although the operation was generally successful, there were some real problems with air traffic control at Port-au-Prince International Airport. These difficulties were fairly handily resolved, nevertheless, and had no significant or lasting effects on the deployment. Security was addressed by the emphasis on force protection and rules of engagement, which, during the anticipated combat phase, were quite robust. Legitimacy was inherent in the execution of a UN mandate and in the safe and peaceful arrival on the ground of U.S. forces and their initial enthusiastic welcome by the Haitian people.

Finally, U.S. restraint was evident when the deployment was changed from a forcible entry to a permissive one. At that point, the flexibility of the U.S. military was demonstrated when the 82d Airborne was turned around in midair, and the 10th Mountain Division directed to land by helicopter in an ostensibly peaceful environment on the morning of September 19. In short, the overall deployment phase was supremely successful.

Employment

While the objective of Operation Uphold Democracy was clear enough during the planning and deployment phases, it rapidly became more ambiguous after the forces landed in Haiti. This was partly due to the change in plans being executed from 2370 and/or 2380 to 2380–Plus (with some inspiration from 2375). Although the strategic objective of restoring democracy did not change, nor the operational objective of establishing a secure and stable environment, the supporting objectives to both became fuzzy; nor was it clear whether these objectives required the FAd'H to be replaced. It was not certain if the agreement worked out with Cedras required that the FAd'H be treated as an ally or a threat. Moreover, under the terms of the peacetime ROE initially in effect, there was no guidance for the 10th Mountain trooper if he encountered Haitian-on-Haitian violence being

perpetrated by his newly acquired "allies" in the FAd'H. As a result, the level of confusion was extremely high in Port-au-Prince.

By contrast, the Marines in Cap Haitien had interpreted the ROE to permit the use of deadly force in self-defense when they perceived that deadly force was about to be directed against them. This interpretation resulted in the fortuitous firefight between the Marines and elements of the FAd'H that established in Cap Haitien, and later in the rest of Haiti, the legitimacy of the intervasion force, despite the fact that many Haitians perceived the Carter-Cedras agreement as a "sellout." The Marines' firefight not only bought time for the JTF and MNF headquarters in Port-au-Prince to adjust the ROE so that troops of the 10th Mountain could intervene in Haitian-on-Haitian violence, but it also ensured that the ROE modification would support the objective. Ultimately, in terms of the principle of the objective, significant redefinition was required on the ground, and for a time, that redefining hindered the effective prosecution of the mission. The question remains, why did the 10th Mountain Division and the Special MAGTF interpret the ROE so differently? Was it a difference in service cultures or the result of the peculiar circumstances of the units involved and their commanders?

While the answers to these questions are speculative, it is likely that unit experience and the personal peculiarities of the commanders were the driving forces. Clearly, the 10th Mountain was strongly influenced by its recent experiences in Somalia as the quick reaction force of UNOSOM II, where the ROE were sometimes overly restrictive and, at other times, not restrictive enough. This experience was coupled with the anticipation that Haitians would behave in ways similar to Somalians.[11]

Mass, too, was somewhat misapplied in the early stages of the operation. While the selection of Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien as centers of gravity dictated the massing of troops in those two cities, forces were overconcentrated in the capital, as well as poorly utilized. Early in the operation, 10th Mountain soldiers did not conduct any night patrols, leaving the streets to the thugs.[12] For a long time, moreover, the soldiers of the division were not used significantly to patrol outside Port-au-Prince, which irritated CINCUSACOM.[13] Again, this overcautious attitude seemed prompted by the division's experience in Somalia during UNOSOM II.

Problems in the application of economy of force (the alter ego of mass) also occurred in the execution of the operation. On the positive side, the SOF forces were appropriate to the economy of force role and

effectively brought stability—a sense of order and security—in the countryside. However, the need was felt for the presence of the heavier division forces to enhance the credibility of the SOF. But, while Colonel Dubik conducted active patrolling in his sector to support the scattered SOF elements, JTF 190 headquarters, in the capital, seemed reluctant to mount similar operations in the city and countryside. The reluctance to put the troops on the streets with the people meant that the principle of economy of force, like that of mass, was somewhat compromised. The difference between the division's units in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien seems to rest on two factors. First was the quite different way in which the division commander and Dubik perceived the Somalia analogy, resulting in directives from the former focusing only on the inherent dangers, while those from the latter addressed opportunity, as evidenced in his more aggressive operation. Second, the fact that Dubik was far enough away from Port-au-Prince that face-to-face communication was difficult gave him significantly greater autonomy than his counterpart in 1 BCT.

Although it did not break down in the technical sense, unity of command did not always result in unity of effort or, in some cases, coordinated actions among separate components of the command. Besides the difficulty in getting 10th Mountain Division to conduct night patrols to establish security in Port-au-Prince and to initiate patrols from the capital into the interior, a lack of coordination existed between the Special Operations Forces and the conventional infantry of the 10th Mountain's 1 BCT. There were also significant discrepancies between JTF 190 and JTF 180, and after the departure of JTF 180, between 190 and USACOM, as well as with various elements of the MNF. By contrast, joint operations in 2 BCT's area of operation went much more smoothly. As for interagency operations, they left much room for improvement. This was due more to the lack of preparation on the part of the interagency players than problems within the military operation itself.

From the first days of the operation, the commander of JTF 180 was unhappy with the performance of the 10th Mountain Division in the Port-au-Prince operational area. Critical of the division's lack of aggressive patrolling in the city and of the problems it experienced in adjusting the ROE to fit the changed situation in Haiti, JTF 180 pushed for changes in 10th Mountain's procedures. After the XVIII Airborne Corps returned to the United States and the 10th assumed responsibility for operations throughout the country as JTF 190, pressure on the division to be more aggressive continued, now emanating from

USACOM. The point was made in a variety of sometimes subtle ways, one of which was a briefing by USACOM for the 10th Mountain on how it envisioned JTF 190 should carry out its mission of aggressive patrolling within and outside the capital.[14] As the higher echelons became more unhappy with the way the 10th Mountain was executing the mission, the 25th Infantry Division was abruptly notified to prepare to take over the operation in Haiti. This notification took place in October.

It should be admitted that as the employment phase progressed, unity of effort began to fall into line. With respect to the MNF, however, effective unity of effort was not achieved until the 25th Infantry Division replaced the 10th Mountain as JTF 190. This change of players had its greatest impact on the way the MNF began to conduct business, with the shift in emphasis from force protection to legitimacy.

While security was generally effective during the employment phase of Operation Uphold Democracy, it was not the rousing success that some initial postoperation discussions made it seem. Security must be considered in terms of force protection as well as the objective of attaining a stable and secure environment. The early emphasis that the 10th Mountain put on force protection—an emphasis it retained throughout its deployment—impacted negatively on its interpretation of the ROE so that initially it refused to act to end Haitian-on-Haitian violence and was reluctant to patrol aggressively within the capital at night and outside the capital at any time. Neither observation pertains to 2 BCT in Cap Haitien, while 1 BCT and Task Force Mountain did become more aggressive as time went on. The result was an increasing balance between security as force protection and security in the achievement of a secure and stable environment.

The employment of military forces during Operation Uphold Democracy clearly reflected the principle of simplicity. With the success of the Carter mission, the need for a complex air operation disappeared and with it any need to violate the principle of simplicity. The only complicating factors came from the MNF and the interagency players. The MNF complication was solved by adherence to the principle of simplicity in assigning the national contingents operating sectors where they were under the tactical control of the MNF commander.[15] While control of interagency players was not established, the solution to the problem they presented was found in the simple expedient of treating them as elements in support of the operation as a whole and gaining their cooperation by request.

Although the perception of the legitimacy of the MNF in Haiti improved significantly from the early days in Port-au-Prince, there was vacillation on the issue. The degree of MNF legitimacy, moreover, varied from zone to zone, depending on what force or unit was in charge. Generally, legitimacy was greater in the Cap Haitien zone than in Port-au-Prince (for reasons already discussed). This was largely because the capital was where overt political activity and resultant problems existed, and these naturally presented the force commander and his political advisers with greater difficulties. Among these was the issue of the prisons, which were not fully brought under MNF control until the 25th Infantry Division relieved the 10th Mountain. In the meantime, the issue resulted in the court-martial of a zealous (some would say overzealous) intelligence captain in the 10th Mountain's Army intelligence, who sought to end what he suspected were human rights abuses in the prisons by taking actions in violation of direct and legal orders from his superiors.[16] Despite, or because of the notoriety brought on by his court-martial, Captain Rockwood was perceived as something of a hero in Haiti. Also complicating the legitimacy issue were a number of things the military forces did not control—the Interim Public Security Force and the new Haitian National Police— as well as the civilian government agencies that needed reestablishing. Although the American military had no control over these organizations, U.S. forces were blamed, to a degree, by the populace for their actions; therefore, U.S. troops took on a more active role than they desired. One example of such involvement was the establishment of Ministry Support Teams from among the U.S. Army civil affairs forces. Borrowing from the experiences in Panama and Kuwait, these teams provided the local government with needed professionals and skills during the critical period in which it was being newly established. Legitimacy was greatest in the interior of the country where the SOF forces held sway and applied their doctrine with great success.

The principle of restraint was successfully applied throughout the employment and subsequent phases of the operation. Even though the U.S. military was criticized at the beginning of the operation for being too restrained, forces over the course of the operation carried out their missions with a high degree of professionalism, innovation, and proper restraint. This result enhanced the operation's credibility and legitimacy.

The principle of perseverance also figured in the operation. Military planning, however, paid limited attention to this precept. This was mostly in the form of the expectation that the largest contingent of the

follow-on UN mission, UNMIH, would be United States forces and that interagency planning looked to an extended period of support to the new Haitian government. Planning, in this regard, however, was neither particularly detailed nor well integrated. At the same time, JTF 180 was being rotated back to the United States, and efforts to reduce the size of the American force moved rapidly ahead without much regard for the actual needs on the ground. This reduction of the American presence was driven by the perception held by America's political leadership of the need to have a quick victory, with as few U.S. troops committed for the long term in Haiti as possible. These conflicting priorities leave a mixed message with regard to perseverance.

Transition

Operation Uphold Democracy never was meant to be a long-term U.S.-led mission. Indeed, UNSCR 940, which established the mandate, also ordered the establishment of a UN Mission advance party in Haiti and directed "that the multinational force will terminate its mission and UNMIH will assume the full range of its functions . . . when a secure and stable environment has been established and UNMIH has adequate force capability and structure . . ."[17] Thus, the mandate not only established the objective for the mission but also determined a transition from a member-led mission to a UN peace operation, an operation that would begin under chapter VII of the UN Charter (threats to the peace) and end in operations under the terms of chapter VI (peaceful settlement of disputes).

The MNF and the UNMIH advance team made significant progress together in determining the objective and its measurement.[18] The measurement of a secure and stable environment had been developed on the ground largely by Colonel Dubik in Cap Haitien and then transferred to the rest of the country.[19] In effect, this meant that Haitian-on-Haitian violence would be significantly reduced, President Aristide would be restored to office, and ministries would begin operating. It also would indicate that the IPSF was being established while the new Haitian national police were being trained. Meanwhile, the MNF would be reduced to the strength of their UNMIH replacement. With these conditions developing, the UN Security Council passed UNSCR 975 on January 30,1995, extending the UNMIH mandate for six months and directing that the transition from MNF to UNMIH be completed by March 31, 1995.

As stated above, the UNMIH force was going to be much less robust than the MNF, with a mere 6,000 troops. While this was adequate for the threat, it raised questions about the effective use of the principle of mass. Would there be enough forces available to control the two centers of gravity and the other population centers, or was the force going to assume significantly more risk by accepting an economy of force role in more places than desirable? To make the combination of mass and economy of force work, the newly appointed UNMIH force commander, U.S. Army Major General Joseph Kinzer, developed a vision-intent statement toward the end of 1994. In it, he identified the tenets of the mission as "unity of command, simplicity, economy of force, objective, security, safety and fiscal stewardship of our resources."[20] To exercise the principle of mass and attain adequate force protection, Kinzer emphasized readiness and stated, "We will design and exercise a reaction force capable of response within the ROE across the spectrum from guard and patrolling to combined operations."[21] Key to carrying out Kinzer's intent with respect to economy of force was the retention of a U.S. SOF capability, a point which had been the subject of some discussion.[22]

While the official record of unity of effort in the transition to UNMIH is one of unquestioned success, the reality is that there were many hitches in the process. First, there was the problem faced by the UNMIH advance party that was directed by UN Headquarters in New York to maintain its distance from the MNF, even though its mission was to plan the transition from MNF to UNMIH.[23] Second, during the period of the MNF and early days of UNMIH, there was significant conflict between the head of the UN Development Programme (UNDP) in Haiti and the mission staff, which was only resolved when UN headquarters replaced the UNDP official in question.[24] Third, although General Kinzer stated, "I see interagency cooperation and unity of effort as the keys to successful overall mission accomplishment," several reports indicate that there was delay and conflict among the agencies—civilian and military, governmental and nongovernmental—that continued to a greater or lesser extent throughout the mission.[25] Symptomatic of the problems in the interagency arena were the complaints of a Canadian CivPol (civilian police) officer about the lack of communication between his organization and the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program of the U.S. Department of Justice, which had complementary responsibilities in training the Haitian National Police.[26] Eventually, however, most of these problems were resolved,

and the multinational staff worked well together in the UNMIH environment.

This was especially true of the relationship between General Kinzer and Special Representative to the Secretary General Lakdar Brahimi. Kinzer also found that his Canadian chief of staff, Colonel Bill Fulton, was an invaluable source of information and sound advice in dealing with the UN.[27] Among the trickier points was the need to separate bilateral U.S.-Haitian relations from those with the UN, particularly because Kinzer was "dual hatted" as the commander of U.S. forces in Haiti. The resolution was that his American deputy would undertake all bilateral representations in conjunction with U.S. Ambassador William Swing.

Transition to UNMIH significantly increased the legitimacy of the operation in the eyes of nearly all the relevant publics. This was true even in the case of the Haitian public, which was reassured by the fact that the force commander was an American and that the largest contingent of troops was American. This relieved any remaining apprehension that the "thugs" were going to return in the near future. In the United States, concerns of the American public, which had grown accustomed to blaming the UN for many of the things that had gone wrong with recent U.S. foreign policy adventures, especially in Somalia,[28] were largely assuaged by the fact that UNMIH was commanded by a U.S. Army general and that the operation had gone so well that the American forces participating had been reduced to a mere 2,400, only a few more than 10 percent of what they had been at the peak. For their part, the Haitian leaders were pleased with the transition because it reduced whatever residual fears President Aristide and his supporters may have had over a repetition of the U.S. Marine occupation of Haiti from 1915 until 1934. As a practical matter, it gave Aristide somewhat more room to maneuver than he had had during the American-led and dominated MNF. The issue of "room to maneuver" also benefited Aristide's opponents, who would have fewer foreign troops interfering in their business, legitimate or not.

The extension of the mandate for six months in January 1995 and again in July was significant in reinforcing both the legitimacy of UNMIH and indicating that the UN was willing to persevere until the mission was completed. The follow-on extensions of the mandate, although the force would no longer include U.S. troops, reinforced both perceptions. When coupled with bilateral American support in the forms of ICITAP, economic assistance, and a U.S. Support Group to coordinate military exercises (especially engineer and medical),

Haitians began to recognize that the international community, including the United States, was prepared to help them help themselves over the long haul. Finally, UN forces, like the MNF before them, exercised admirable restraint in the use of force. Their presence was extremely effective, especially when coupled with behavior that was both restrained but brooked no nonsense. The unanswered question with respect to the use of military forces in a peacekeeping operation remains whether more is gained by regularly moving among the people with kevlar helmets and body armor than is lost by not presenting a view that the environment is adequately secure and stable.

Redeployment

With the end of the third extension of the UN mandate in December 1995, UNMIH began to plan and execute the transition to end the major U.S. participation. A new force commander was named, a Canadian general, and UNMIH's chief of staff, Colonel Fulton, executed a transition that marked the redeployment of all American troops, including those of the U.S. Support Group.[29]

Colonel David Patton, Commander, U.S. Support Group, had planned to stay in Haiti continuously through the changeover from an American-commanded UNMIH to a Canadian command. On Christmas Eve, 1995, Patton briefed General John Shalikashvili, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the Support Group plans, which included leaving its approximately seventy-person headquarters in place. The general complimented him on the plan but said that for political reasons—the administration had promised that all U.S. troops would come out of Haiti—the Support Group was coming out too. It would return after a short but decent interval.[30] With this action, the United States sent several, often conflicting signals. First, it indicated to the UN, the Haitians, the American public, and all concerned that the U.S. government thought its mission in Haiti was over. This both delegitimized the U.S. contingency involvement in the eyes of the American people and indicated to the Haitians that the United States and the international community were not willing to persevere to achieve a long-term solution to Haiti's problems. Second, and conversely, the return of the Support Group and its continued operation, generally with around 500 engineers and/or medical personnel, reinforced both the legitimacy and perseverance of the American involvement. The signals were clearly mixed.

Redeployment of all U.S. military forces along with some UN contingents clearly deemphasized the principle of mass while, at the same time, stressing the principle of economy of force. Indeed, redeployment brought out the most effective economy of force units—the SOF elements, as well as most of the combat forces—replacing them with undertrained and weakly commanded Haitian National Police supported by a CivPol that would, over the next year, be reduced from 900 to 300. ICITAP attempted to train these new police in a new academy, under a five-year contract with the Haitians. Coordination between ICITAP and CivPol was hardly perfect, however, and there is little indication that it has improved to any great extent. As a result, security in Haiti has been reduced somewhat from the days of the original transition to UNMIH, to the extent that President René Preval (who succeeded Aristide) had to request U.S. assistance to retrain his executive protection service after it was found to have been infected with a severe case of politicization.[31] In short, all of the measures of long-term strategic success for the operation are mixed at best.

Conclusion

What was accomplished by Operation Uphold Democracy? In simple terms, a bunch of thugs was finally removed from Haiti, and the government was returned to the Haitian president who had been elected by the people. A series of free and relatively fair elections were held to legitimize the holders of legislative and municipal offices, and, finally, a new president was elected who took the office peacefully from his elected predecessor—the first such transition for Haiti since 1804. But democracy is more than free and honest elections, and the efforts to restructure the economy and the judiciary of Haiti have lagged far behind, while the international community, led by the United States, has been rapidly losing interest in the Haitian experiment. As the UNMIH mission wound down, the indications were that Haiti would most likely revert to the kind of authoritarian regime it has known since it won its independence—what scholars of Haiti have dubbed "a predatory regime."

This conclusion sounds very much like it is heralding the failure of a mission that has been touted as nearly a complete success. How can we explain this seeming paradox? The problem lies in the linkage between the strategic and operational levels of conflict. In fact, the issue is that there was a disconnect between the strategic objective of restoring and upholding democracy and the operational objective of maintaining a

secure and stable environment in Haiti. What was required to ensure strategic success was a set of operational objectives leading clearly to the upholding of democracy, which would describe an operational end state that made the desired democratic outcome as nearly certain as possible. This was not accomplished.

Although the principles of war were addressed at the operational level, emphasis was not on reaching the desired strategic end state. Rather, for example, both planners and executors focused on achieving and maintaining the legitimacy of the force and, only secondarily, on the legitimacy of the government. Thus, it was always assumed that President Aristide had legitimacy because he had been elected and not that he had to work to maintain that legitimacy. As the scheduled presidential elections approached, there appeared to be a campaign to extend Aristide in office to account for his three years in exile or to change the constitution so that he could run again. Although Aristide did not make these arguments, his refusal to endorse the candidacy of his friend, ally, and former prime minister convinced most observers that the president was behind this campaign. As a result, only when Aristide's behavior demonstrated that he was bent on extending his mandate did UNMIH focus on the legitimacy of the electoral system as opposed to that of the Aristide regime.

Similarly, the principle of security, more often than not, was addressed in terms of force protection rather than with respect to the security of the people of Haiti—those on the streets of Port-au-Prince as well as in the villages of the interior. Nor was security, as a principle, linked to the economic well-being that is essential to the legitimacy of a system of government. In short, the probable strategic failure of the intervasion of Haiti has roots in the fact alluded to in our discussion of planning: that is, the political-military plan for Haiti, the first of its kind, was poorly integrated with the strictly military plans. The lesson for future operations is that there is a need to develop political-military plans fully and in complete coordination with—and in such a way that they drive—the military planning process. Only in this way can we be assured that a predatory state will not return to render our efforts useless.

Notes

Chapter 4

1. These principles are found in Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 100-5, *Operations*, Washington, D.C., 1993, and Joint Pub 3-0, *Operations*, Washington, D.C., 1993, and Joint Pub 3-07, *Military Operations Other Than War*, Washington, D.C., 1995. The principles of MOOTW are found in both FM 100-5—where they are called principles of operations other than war (a subtle difference)—and the joint pubs. We refer to them and the environment in which they operate as MOOTW out of deference to the recent Army decision to cease using the term OOTW; however, the joint term, by direction of the chairman, JCS, still takes precedence.

2. Although several definitions of "legitimacy" are used in current field manuals, joint pubs, and political science writing, the way in which we are using the term derives from and expands somewhat on these definitions. We use legitimacy to mean the perception that a government has the moral right, as well as the legal right, to govern and that governments or international actors are perceived to be acting in morally and legally right ways.

3. Transition refers to the transition from the UN-sanctioned U.S.-MNF operation to the UN's own UNMIH operation, as well as to the second phase of UNMIH, when U.S. forces turned over the operation entirely to a Canadian-led UN force.

4. See chapter 2 in this publication.

5. UN S/RES 940, July 31, 1994.

6. See chapter 2 in this publication.

7. Ibid.

8. UN S/RES 940, July 31, 1994, paragraph 8.

9. Robert Pastor, a member of the Carter team, recounted the story that Biamby fled with Cedras and that the U.S. team had to make contact with Mrs. Cedras to get the general to reinitiate

negotiations so that the U.S. team could conclude terms successfully. Interview with Robert Pastor by John T. Fishel, September 1995.

10. The *Tonton Macoutes*, a Creole phrase meaning bogeyman, were the secret police of the Duvalier regimes.

11. See chapter 3 in this publication. It should be remembered that the 10th Mountain Division was also the ARFOR of UNITAF under its previous commander, then-Major General Steven Arnold, and had a wholly different experience than it had had in UNOSOM II.

12. Ibid.

13. USACOM briefing slides, n.d., circa October 1994.

14. Ibid.

15. TACON (tactical control) means that the force commander can assign missions to a unit within the terms of reference agreed upon at the governmental level but cannot task organize the unit.

16. For a more complete description of this case, see chapter 3.

17. UNSCR 940, July 31, 1994, paragraph 8.

18. Interview with Colonel William Greenawald, UNMIH advance party operations officer, by John T. Fishel, Ft. Leavenworth, Kansas, August 1995. Interview with Colonel Bill Fulton (Canada), UNMIH chief of staff, by John T. Fishel, Port-au-Prince, Haiti, January 1996.

19. John T. Fishel, "Haiti Ain't No Panama, Jack," paper prepared for conference on Haitian recovery, Mayaguez, Puerto Rico, September 1995.

20. Joseph W. Kinzer, "Military Commander's Vision/Intent," draft, n.d., circa December 1994.

21. Ibid.

22. Greenawald Interview.

23. Ibid. Colonel Greenawald speculated that the reason had to do with the traditional UN reluctance to get too close to any national force, thereby identifying itself as a mere extension of the foreign policy of that nation.

24. Interviews with U.S. officer involved with the training of the UNMIH staff by John T. Fishel, spring 1995. Interview with Dr. Bryant Freeman, director, Haitian Studies Institute, University of Kansas, and a member of MICIVIH and of General Kinzer's staff at various times, by John T. Fishel, 1995.

25. Kinzer. See also briefing slides, "Haiti Unconventional Operations," 3d Special Forces Group (Abn), November 12, 1994–April 22, 1995. See also interviews with officers and staff in Haiti by John T. Fishel, January 1996.

26. Interview with Canadian CivPol officer by John T. Fishel, January 1996. CivPol is the part of UNMIH that is responsible for the day-to-day supervision of the HNP.

27. Interviews with Major John Charlton, aide-de-camp to General Kinzer, by John T. Fishel, March 1997. Interview with Colonel Bill Fulton, UNMIH chief of staff, by John T. Fishel, January 1996.

28. See Dr. Frank Newport and Leslie McAneny, "Haiti Yields Clinton Small 'Rally Effect,'" *The Gallup Poll Monthly* (September 1994): 18–19. See also, Donald E. Schulz, "Whither Haiti?" (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), 19–25, and P. A. Dostert, J.D., *Latin America 1996* (Harpers Ferry, WV: Stryker-Post Publications, 1996), 122.

29. Fulton Interview.

30. Interview with Colonel David Patton, Commander, U.S. Support Group, Haiti, by John T. Fishel, January 1996

31. In 1997, the executive protection service was found to have been engaged in extralegal political violence that prompted the U.S.-imposed retraining.

5

Uphold Democracy: A Comparative Summary and Conclusion

Walter E. Kretchik

The United States possesses a long and contentious history of military involvement in the affairs of Caribbean republics. From the late 1890s to the mid-1930s, many of these episodes took the form of active intervention, America's so-called "Banana Wars." During this period, U.S. military commanders roamed the tropics, landed troops, occupied countries, and quieted political turbulence in an effort to maintain order and stability. In 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt justified this behavior in his famous "corollary" to the Monroe Doctrine, arrogating to the United States the responsibility for policing the Caribbean region.[1] TR's successors, while at times using other justifications, pursued interventionist policies very similar to Roosevelt's. One such case was the U.S. intervention in Haiti, ordered by President Woodrow Wilson in 1915.

Strategic Situational Awareness

To some observers today, the use of the military instrument in Haiti from 1915 to 1934 seems quite similar to Operation Uphold Democracy in 1994. In both instances, U.S. forces operated to establish order and stability. But the two operations differ significantly in *why* and *how* the United States conducted them. While, as chapter 1 reflects, the intervention by U.S. Marines in 1915 aimed at restoring order to an unstable Haiti, the reasons for undertaking such a difficult endeavor were directly linked to American security. In short, the operation sought, in accordance with the Monroe Doctrine, to keep Germany from enhancing its position in the Caribbean. This is not to say that other, nonstrategic considerations did not accompany this overarching concern. On a more personal level, for example, certain U.S. political leaders and Marine Corps officers at the time perceived a role for American forces as the fatherly protectors of a juvenile Haitian society that was susceptible to European dependency. (Inherent in this paternalistic mission, of course, were feelings of White superiority that ultimately caused Haiti's self-appointed benefactors to distance

inactivated as part of the early 1990s force drawdown mentioned earlier in this chapter. The 9th Regiment, now an independent or separate brigade, was seeking missions to avoid being caught in the drawdown itself. The leaders of I Corps, the senior headquarters at Fort Lewis, saw the MOG mission as an ideal way to give the 9th Regiment a real mission within its capabilities. Trenda noted that McMillian's lack of Spanish proved to be detrimental and led to his removal as the MOG commander later on. Trenda, in a separate comment to this author, identified McMillian as a hyper individual who had trouble relaxing and getting some sleep. According to Trenda, McMillian drove himself and his staff to the point of exhaustion, thus his removal from the team was more due to McMillian's personality than his lacking Spanish.

91. Trenda Interview.

92. Robert A. Pastor, "A Short History of Haiti," *Foreign Service Journal* (November 1995): 3.

93. Bonham Interview, 32.

94. In this publication, for the sake of consistency, the plan will also be called OPLAN 2375.

95. Interview with Major David Stahl by Lieutenant Colonel Steve Dietrich, Center of Military History, 1994, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

96. Lieutenant Colonel James L. Dunn and Major Jon M. Custer, "Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY: The Role of the SOCOORD as Part of a Joint Task Force," *Special Warfare,* (July 1995): 29.

97. Author unknown, "Unpublished Notes, Planning Intervention in Haiti," Ft. Leavenworth, KS, 1996, 2.

98. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Phil Idiart by Walter E. Kretchik, December 1995, U.S. Atlantic Command, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

99. Michael R. Gordon, "Top U.S. Officials Outline Strategy for Haiti Invasion," *New York Times*, September 14, 1994, 1. John

themselves from the country's population, elite and poor alike.) Still, in absence of the German question, it is doubtful that Wilson would have deployed the Marines. Once in Haiti, they set up an occupation government as the vehicle for creating order and stability. The legacy of that government and the occupation as a whole continues even today to affect Haitian views of Americans.[2]

Neither a strategic threat from Europe nor a misplaced sense of paternalism prompted the U.S. action in Haiti in 1994. Rather, that "intervasion" was motivated, on one level, by the moral and humanitarian outrage generated by a predatory regime that, having recently deposed a democratically elected president, showed few qualms about brutalizing its own people, many of whom fled by boat to the United States. In the interests of democracy and human rights, both the Organization of American States (OAS) and the United Nations condemned the Haitian junta led by Lieutenant General Raoul Cedras and enacted economic sanctions designed to pressure his government into capitulation. Unfortunately, these regional and international measures, despite the intentions behind them, tended to hurt the Haitian people more than the government, causing even more Haitians to flee the country.

While President George Bush struggled with the plight of the "Boat People," it was his successor, Bill Clinton, who felt the full brunt of their impact on domestic politics. His decision to intervene in Haiti can only be understood fully with reference to these internal considerations. To begin with, the president could not ignore the political pressure generated by the congressional Black Caucus, whose members were heartily criticizing his failure to implement preelection promises to ease restrictions on Haitian immigration. Furthermore, as long as the restrictions were in effect, the president needed to find a suitable means for locating and processing the mounting wave of "Boat People." Adding to these domestic pressures was the USS *Harlan County* debacle in Port-au-Prince harbor, where in October 1993 a group of drunken Haitian thugs from the FRAPH appeared to humiliate the United States (as well as the UN) by running off a U.S. flag-carrying naval vessel. Under the circumstances, a strong U.S. response to the Haitian crisis was one course of action that offered Clinton a way to extract himself from a delicate political situation. A strong response, in turn, could count on multinational support, given the concerns voiced by the OAS and UN. It is not inconceivable that future peace operations might also become a means to solve complex U.S. domestic political concerns through an international venue.

Just as there are differences as to *why* U.S. troops entered Haiti in 1915 and 1994, so, too, is there a clear difference as to *how* they were employed. The source of this difference can be found in the circumstances and assumptions underlying the use of military power in each case. In 1915, U.S. Marines responded to an urgent appeal to Washington from the American ambassador in Haiti. There was little time to formulate a detailed plan or to derive, in today's terminology, a clear "end state"; rather, the Marines simply landed and, after establishing a position of dominance, tried to determine what needed to be done. In contrast, planning for what became the U.S. "intervasion" in 1994 began several years in advance as an effort to be prepared for a noncombatant evacuation operation. Later, in the months preceding Uphold Democracy, planners shifted their focus to an invasion of Haiti and included in their plans a deadline for extracting U.S. troops. Unlike the 1915 operation, which had no apparent exit strategy, the 1994 operation was envisioned to last anywhere from a few weeks to possibly six months, depending on the achievement of specific objectives. In short, an exit plan was central to U.S. thinking from the start. There would be no twenty-year occupation or U.S.-controlled government as in the first intervention, but a turnover of peace operations to the United Nations once American forces had established stability in Haiti. Civilian and military decision makers in the United States simply assumed that there would be considerable domestic pressure for a quick handover to the UN and that the American people would want their men and women in uniform "home by Christmas," or by some similarly arbitrary deadline.

Concerns about the fickleness of public support for American military operations abroad limited what the U.S. government could realistically hope to accomplish in Haiti during Uphold Democracy. Ideally, peace operations should avoid specific exit deadlines, since success or failure then becomes a condition of an operation's duration rather than its attainment of critical objectives. That said, however, no U.S. politician can reasonably be expected to support a long-term occupation of a foreign country. In the case of Uphold Democracy, plans linked exit deadlines to achievements; in reality, the issue of when the troops were coming home generated more public discussion than what they were accomplishing. This meant, as Don Schulz notes, halfway efforts that led to halfway, ineffective, and counterproductive results.[3]

Whether the focus is on 1915 or 1994, the *decision* to apply the military instrument of power and the *policy* for employing it originate

within the civilian-led sectors of the American government, specifically within the Executive Branch. In this context, one aspect of the strategic planning for Uphold Democracy deserves mention: for the first time in a peace operation, U.S. government officials produced a tangible interagency plan that set forth America's political-military policy in the crisis. The plan was not perfect. It was, for one thing, tilted in favor of military concerns, largely because of the predominant role the Department of Defense and USACOM played in drafting it. It was also in no way comparable to the joint OPLANs nor well integrated with them. Still, despite these qualifications, the interagency plan provides the best example to date of cooperation between top-level political and military actors anticipating a peace operation.

Operational Aspects

In 1915, U.S. President Wilson used military force in Haiti in response to an immediate crisis, then figured out, much later, how to use that force to bring stability to the country. In contrast, the U.S. National Command Authority in 1994 planned and envisioned from the start how it would use military power operationally in Haiti. Initially, the policy makers of the Interagency Working Group and the appropriate U.S. military headquarters planned for a UN-sanctioned invasion and hostile takeover of the country. Labeled as a forcible-entry option, U.S. forces under OPLAN 2370 were to destroy key points of the Haitian infrastructure with aerial gunfire and conduct airborne insertions, raids, and air assaults to seize control of critical nodes. Those Haitian FAd'H and military police who resisted would be killed or captured. The unilateral American invasion force, consisting primarily of the 82d Airborne Division, Special Operations Forces, and U.S. Marines, expected first to engage in combat, after which it would make the transition to peace operations. As it turned out, U.S. troops came perilously close to having to shoot their way into Haiti. If the Carter Team's negotiations with the junta had not aborted, the insertion of the American invasion force, the OPLAN 2370 variant, would have resulted in at least brief combat and the potential loss of American and Haitian lives. Today, emerging U.S. Army doctrine cautions that a peace operation may, in fact, begin with short-lived offensive or defensive combat operations, during or after which stability and other noncombat operations in support of national objectives commence.[4]

The Marine invasion force in 1915 landed quickly in Haiti, quelled local disturbances, and eventually garrisoned the country. The leathernecks operated as a large security force within the cities, but as

noted in chapter 1, they also patrolled the countryside to put down Caco uprisings and to keep the peace. Once they had stabilized Haiti, the Marines reverted to occupation and mundane garrison duties, contributing to the administration, security, and internal development of the country, while U.S. government officials interacted with Haitian authorities. The Marines continued in support of U.S. policies toward Haiti until 1934 when, after nearly twenty years, the occupation ended.

American troops arriving in Haiti in 1994 confronted a highly uncertain and ambiguous situation. As a result of the Carter negotiations, combat operations to gain entry into the country and to topple the Cedras regime became unnecessary. Instead, U.S. armed forces found themselves trying to restore to office a democratically elected leader, while cooperating with the very government that had ousted him in the first place, a government that Washington had branded as illegitimate. That situation led initially to confusion for Haitians and U.S. forces alike and brought home the need for flexibility and adaptation. Plans for Operation Uphold Democracy had been based on three options: a forcible or hostile entry, an uncertain entry, and a permissive entry.[5] To deal with the situation that American troops actually confronted in Haiti, the U.S. commander ordered that the plans based on these options be modified, a tasking met in a timely way by planners working the issue. Staff officers who find themselves planning future peace operations should take heed of this example and be prepared to make last-minute mission adjustments of more than minor proportions.

As shown in chapters 2 and 3, Uphold Democracy revealed that the National Security Council and its IWG carry a great responsibility, not only in planning but also in executing peace operations. Yet many of the Executive Branch departments and other agencies that made up the NSC had little to no experience in conducting such operations. In Uphold Democracy, for example, the U.S. Departments of Justice and State failed to assemble the International Police Monitors called for in the political-military plan to supervise the newly formed Haitian Interim Public Security Force. That task fell, by default, to DOD and USACOM. Only last-minute heroics by members of the JCS and the USACOM J5, in close coordination with Department of State and government contractors, salvaged the effort to create a credible Haitian security force, an imperative political objective.

After military operations had secured Haiti, many nongovernmental agencies and private volunteer organizations lagged in their support of essential U.S. government programs and policies. Further hindering

these programs, U.S. Army, Marines, and Special Operations Forces were forbidden, after they had secured Haiti, to assist in upgrading the country's infrastructure beyond what U.S. military necessity demanded. Colonel Jim Dubik noted that he could only construct one bridge—for military use—over a swollen stream, despite the local population's demand and need for two others. Lacking support of the necessary civilian agencies, U.S. Army commanders, attempting to help the Haitian people, soon became masters of creating military justifications for what, in reality, was nation assistance. This experience should be instructive for military planners who, in anticipating the fog and friction of a forthcoming peace operation, need to consider that civilian organizations will not always arrive in a timely fashion and that commanders might have to take certain creative measures to further the achievement of known political objectives.

Uphold Democracy introduced U.S. forces into a culture vastly different from their own. Yet, in planning for the Haiti operation, the Army, in general, had little appreciation of Haitian history and culture. Few planners knew anything about Haiti, other than its basic geography. In a combat operation, where overwhelming firepower achieves objectives, sensitivity for the local population's culture and traditions clearly is not a top priority. In a peace operation such as Uphold Democracy, however, knowledge of how a people think and act, and how they might react to military intervention arguably becomes paramount. The U.S. military culture, in general, focuses on training warriors to use fire and maneuver and tends to resist the notion of cultural awareness. When Lieutenant Colonel Tom Adams, an instructor at Fort Leavenworth, asked Dr. Bryant Freeman, a noteworthy Haitian expert from the University of Kansas, to provide his expertise to help train UNMIH, Freeman gladly volunteered. At least one U.S. officer, however, stated that he did not appreciate having to listen to anyone who did not wear a uniform.[6] Freeman eventually overcame such narrow-minded rebuffs and went on to become a valued adviser to Major General Joseph Kinzer, Commander, UNMIH.

There is a certain amount of U.S. political and military operational arrogance in Uphold Democracy that bears mentioning. Chapter 3 reflects upon U.S. participation in Haiti with CARICOM, a unit formed to bring a multinational presence to what had theretofore been a unilateral American operation. As Fishel notes in chapter 4, the United States in peace operations tends to request the assistance of other nations' forces to demonstrate that American actions are *multi*national and not *uni*lateral. Yet CARICOM, a force that could have provided a

wealth of intelligence and experience specific to the Caribbean area, did little more than perform routine mission tasks. It was not part of the forced-entry option and did not share the initial risks as part of JTF 180 and JTF 190. CARICOM, in a way, was snubbed, appearing to be on the receiving end of U.S.-procured equipment, without sharing the same hazards as the rest of the force. While CARICOM was clearly an ad hoc unit of varied training levels, multinational forces should share the same risks as U.S. forces in the interest of coalition cohesion.

Tactical Observations

In the 1915 occupation, most enlisted Marines and NCOs went about their daily business without a great amount of interaction with the Haitian people. Indeed, the majority of Marines who served in Haiti knew the locals only from hunting them down as Cacos, training them as gendarmes, or observing them on a daily basis as they walked the streets. Marine officers were more likely than the enlisted men to meet and befriend Haitians, yet even this interaction was inhibited by racial views then prominent in American society. As a consequence of the language barrier and American social taboos, Marines, in general, could spend a multiyear tour in Haiti without even speaking to a Haitian.

The way in which the Haitian people were engaged by U.S. forces during Uphold Democracy poses possibly the greatest controversy of that operation. The 10th Mountain Division's modus operandi in Haiti adopted a radically different approach from the Joint Special Operations Task Force, or JSOTF, toward tactical mission accomplishment and dealing with the local population. While U.S. Army Special Forces moved freely throughout the country and mingled with the people (except in the capital), the 10th Mountain in Port-au-Prince, by and large, remained a secluded force. Some argue that this was the consequence of a "Somalia syndrome," referring to the psychological disposition that the division supposedly acquired as a result of its experience in that African country. According to this thesis, the 10th Mountain Division behaved timidly in Haiti because of the casualties it had received in its bitter experience with mobs and gangs in Somalia. The nexus between Somalia and Haiti was made explicit by Lieutenant Colonel Randall P. Munch of the 10th Mountain Division, who observed during Uphold Democracy, "I think it should be noted that a lot of these [10th Mountain] officers and non-commissioned officers are Somalia veterans. Very often we have fallen back to the same tactics and techniques that we used in Somalia."[7]

To gain a better understanding of whether or not the 10th Mountain Division was suffering from a Somalia syndrome, one should examine OPLAN 2380 and the ramifications it entailed. During the planning phase of the Haiti operation, USACOM, on the orders of the NCA and JCS, directed the 10th Mountain to prepare an OPLAN for a permissive situation in which the Haitian junta and the FAd'H-police would be in control of the country with the intent and capability of cooperating with JTF 190.[8] The division was also to train for the scenario set forth in the plan. What 10th Mountain produced was a plan that anticipated a permissive *or an uncertain* environment. USACOM had not directed the division to plan for the latter scenario, in which host government forces, whether opposed or receptive to JTF 190, did not have total effective control of the territory and population. Yet, as written, OPLAN 2380 required 10th Mountain to train for two distinct missions, one permissive and one uncertain. In effect, by writing a plan that included the possibility of an uncertain environment, the division stood to duplicate what JTF 180 was supposedly preparing under OPLAN 2375.[9]

As it turned out, the 10th Mountain Division did not train for the two environments simultaneously. Rather, it concentrated on the uncertain scenario and emphasized training for combat. Colonel Andrew Berdy, Commander, 1 BCT, spent a great deal of time putting his rifle platoons and squads through day and night live-fire exercises to improve their marksmanship and small-unit tactics—a training method more reflective of an uncertain, rather than a permissive, situation.[10] It could be assumed that, since the 10th Mountain Division was also part of OPLAN 2370, or the hostile option, Berdy was simply training his unit for that contingency. But as he himself conceded, that was not the case:

> We were not privy to 2370; that was a compartmented plan. And, consequently, we did not know who was going to be on the ground. I will tell you that if it had come off, I would be very uncomfortable, and that's putting it lightly . . . now I'm sure at the eleventh hour, maybe it would have been made known to us, but that's bull shit. You don't do that; you don't risk that. Now if they're concerned about OPSEC [operational security], then have trusted agents. There wasn't even any of that. If there was, it was at the Division level. But clearly, the operator on the ground, and the 1st Brigade Combat Team, needed to have someone who was read in on that, and I didn't have that.[11]

If the 1 BCT's emphasis on training for an uncertain environment was not derived from OPLAN 2370, the question remains as to whether

it was driven by the Somalia experience. Yet, as Colonel Thomas Miller, JTF 190, J3, indicated, "[I]f anything, it's [a] lesson learned from Somalia that you never drop your guard. That you treat every single operation you do as a combat operation."[12]

The preparation for combat by the 10th Mountain did prepare the division for the mission it ultimately executed under OPORD 2380 Plus, a mission that assumed uncertain Haitian conditions. Yet OPORD 2380 Plus did not reflect Haiti's political realities. The junta and the FAd'H were very much in total control of the country on September 20, 1994. Therefore, the actual situation, as defined by U.S. joint doctrine, was in fact *permissive*. However, both JTF 180 and JTF 190 did not believe that the junta or the FAd'H would willingly cooperate; therefore, JTF 180 chose to label 2380 Plus as *uncertain*. It appears, then, that the 10th Mountain Division and its higher headquarters at XVIII Airborne Corps either misinterpreted or did not fully understand U.S. joint doctrine definitions of permissive, uncertain, and hostile environments. In essence, U.S. forces did not know the junta's *intentions* and therefore expected the worst case, which doctrinally meant a *hostile* environment.

For these reasons, 10th Mountain Division soldiers arrived in Haiti prepared for combat or a hostile situation, as demonstrated by their expectation of having to "take down" or secure Port-au-Prince airport. Colonel Berdy noted that, when he arrived at the airfield, he was surprised to discover U.S. Special Forces securing the terminal building—one of his designated objectives.[13] Soldiers from the 10th Mountain Division further reflected a combat posture when they moved to the Light Industrial Complex, where they stacked sandbags, wore combat helmets and Kevlar body armor, and adopted a "bunker mentality." Despite the mission to secure Haiti, the 1st BCT (which occupied Port-au-Prince) spent most of the first two weeks patrolling the streets only during daylight. During the night, the reduced or nonexistent U.S. military presence and the absence of policemen enabled thugs in the capital to prey upon the Haitian people. Combat posture or not, the above actions at least demonstrate that the 10th Mountain Division was extremely cautious and uncertain in how it undertook its initial mission in the Haitian capital.

There was, as discussed in chapter 3, another side of the division's method of operation. In Cap Haitien, where Colonel James Dubik's 2d BCT operated, the situation was handled much differently from that in the capital. U.S. soldiers in Cap Haitien, although again dressed in combat gear, worked aggressively among the Haitian people and

established their presence, as called for in the operational plan. Dubik personally coordinated with local Haitian officials and authorities to explain, in detail, everything from what the U.S. military was doing in Haiti to what constituted democracy. As Dubik put it, "I had to conduct a civics lesson everyday."[14] As one Special Forces officer observed, the 10th Mountain Division in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien were in two different worlds.[15]

One possible explanation other than the Somalia syndrome for the different approaches taken by 10th Mountain Division elements in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haitien is that the threat to U.S. forces in the capital was greater. Yet, as noted by a key officer within the military intelligence brigade in support of the 10th Mountain Division, the threat to U.S. forces was fairly consistent across Haiti. Although there were instances of U.S. troops being attacked by Haitians, those rare cases tended to be acts of random violence.[16] Another explanation for the different operating procedures was put forth by several officers from the 10th Mountain Division staff who raised the issue of the command climate within the division.[17] The command group, an organization headed by the division commander and his staff, was located in Port-au-Prince, primarily within the Light Industrial Complex, and tended to prescribe, supervise closely, and enforce strictly all military operations in Port-au-Prince, to include force protection and U.S.-Haitian interaction. Numerous 10th Mountain Division officers and enlisted men observed certain command group members castigating soldiers who exhibited the slightest variance from the force protection policy and ordering, on at least one occasion, U.S. soldiers to avoid engaging the local populace.[18] Under these conditions, people like Major Len Gaddis, the civil affairs officer and thus the individual charged with establishing solid relations with the local populace, were hard-pressed to accomplish their doctrinal role. As Gaddis put it,

> I was one of the few people who could actually get out into the streets and talk to the people. To do that I almost had to sneak out [of the perimeter] to do my job because my office was on the LIC where Haitians could not access [enter] it. Security was paramount. I knew more about what the people were thinking by getting around than the command group did, which was unfortunate. They could have done what I did but they wouldn't walk around.[19]

While the above evidence does not fully explain why two separate headquarters operated so differently in Haiti, it does indicate that

command presence and location influenced military actions. In fact, one 10th Mountain Division officer went so far as to assert that the division's method of operation varied by location simply because the "division commander was in Port-au-Prince and Dubik was in Cap Haitien."[20] To some, that appeared to be the crux of the matter.

Did a Somalia syndrome exist? If it did, it might have derived from nothing more than the transfer of military experience from one peace operation to another. Yet that perception does not explain how two 10th Mountain Division BCTs, each composed of 40 percent Somalia veterans, operated so differently in Haiti. Further, did the Somalia experience influence key leaders and their decision making? What was the effect of the Mogadishu debacle in political guidance, campaign design, tactical actions, or in shaping force protection levels? Those questions remain unanswered but certainly warrant further investigation for the benefit of future peace operations.

Regardless of the possible baggage carried out of Somalia, the incongruities in mission posture between the 10th Mountain Division and the Special Operations Forces was clearly evident to the Haitian community. To some members of the Haitian elite, the 10th Mountain's aloofness in Port-au-Prince was somewhat reminiscent of another U.S. occupation, almost eighty years earlier. Other Haitians who had lived in the United States protested that they saw nothing democratic in the 10th Mountain Division's behavior in the capital. Those Haitians observed American soldiers consciously distancing themselves from the Haitian people and therefore losing an opportunity to uphold U.S. democratic principles. While some Haitians knew from experience that the U.S. Army does not wander American cities conducting patrols and weapon sweeps on a daily basis, that nuance was lost upon the uneducated masses in the capital. To some unknowing Haitians, the 1 BCT might be acting exactly like it routinely did in New York. By failing to patrol at night, the 10th also appeared much like the FAd'H's military police, whom they had replaced.[21] Once 1 BCT, 10th Mountain Division, began to conduct night patrols, its change in operational method further confused the Haitian people. Moreover, the image of U.S. soldiers handing out food, visiting schools, and holding children—all while wearing Kevlar helmets and body armor—presented a schizophrenic appearance that served unwittingly to undermine U.S. national strategic objectives.

The 10th Mountain Division's paradoxical approach to operations in Port-au-Prince seems to have originated with the strong emphasis placed upon force protection. To the 10th Mountain Division

leadership, force protection not only drove the mission, it almost *became* the mission. The potential for American casualties was foremost in the minds of some key division leaders. Colonel Miller pointed out that, "most of our fights today are categorized successful by the number of bodies; the number of dead Americans. If there had been an enemy fighting [in Haiti] we would have lost some people, and then I don't know what the folks above us would define as successful. I think you'd have a whole different picture."[22]

The 10th Mountain Division leadership, in an effort to avoid combat casualties, chose to intimidate the Haitian population—the same populace that it was meant to provide with safety and security. Miller explained the 10th Mountain Division rationale this way:

> [P]eacekeeping/peace enforcement does not mean anything for a rifle squad leader; it means a lot to me; [to] the Commanding General, but it means nothing to a rifle squad leader. He is going out on the street in a combat operation, because of the potential for hostility, force protection is always going to remain paramount. [T]he way to ensure force protection for them [U.S. soldiers], is through overwhelming combat force. We have it so you should use it, because we've got good leaders that can constrain the use of that and understand how to apply it. [T]he peoples of nations like Haiti [then] understand that you mean business. . . .[23]

In essence, some members of the 10th Mountain Division leadership saw Uphold Democracy as a tactical combat mission in every sense, except for the physical application of continuous violence through firepower. The view that Uphold Democracy was a combat operation drove how the division protected itself. That posture not only intimidated the Haitians, as expected, it also threatened to unravel the entire idea of upholding democracy. The Haitians, many of whom had preconceived expectations of their American "liberators," now felt betrayed due to a command-directed, physical barrier between themselves and the U.S. soldiers, who represented Americans and their democratic values. Despite a relaxation of that separation over time, the 10th Mountain Division had caused many Haitians to question what American democracy is all about.[24]

In contrast to the 10th Mountain Division, the Special Forces community, and especially Brigadier General Richard W. Potter, Jr., won a hard fight to avoid Kevlar protection and bunkers. Although well armed, SF soldiers carried their weapons in a manner that was not obviously threatening. In doing so, the Special Forces moved freely

among the Haitian people, who appreciated and respected the more open, albeit risky, posture. Force protection, to Colonel Marc Boyatt, of 3d Special Forces Group, became "hearing what the people needed and getting it for them, especially electrical power, food, and other necessities."[25] The notion of hearing what the populace was saying, or gathering "street rhythms" as Lieutenant General Shelton put it, served the U.S. Special Forces community in Haiti well.[26]

While different methods of operation generated some friction between the two types of forces, that contention should not be overstated. Some officers in Haiti perceived no serious discord between the 10th Mountain Division and the Special Forces soldiers. Colonel Miller noted that any differences between those units was merely a matter of properly aligning objectives.[27] Brigadier General Potter also indicated that, although there was an initial misunderstanding on the part of conventional commanders as to the capabilities and modus operandi of Special Operations Forces, the relationship between SOF and the 10th Mountain Division was, on the whole, good.[28] Still, the overall experience in Haiti would indicate that SOF was much more mission adaptive and attuned to the needs of the people than most conventional forces.

The replacement of Meade's 10th Mountain Division by Major General George Fisher's 25th Infantry Division remains, at this point, controversial. Members of the FORSCOM staff describe the unit rotation as a planned event, based largely upon the 10th Mountain Division's operational tempo, changing Haitian election dates, and the impending transition of control of the operation from U.S. forces to the United Nations Mission in Haiti.[29] Others, however, suggest that the 25th Infantry Division replaced the 10th Mountain Division not only for the above rationale but also to alleviate the strained relationship between the 10th Mountain commander and the Commander, XVIII Airborne Corps.[30] Regardless, neither OPLAN 2370, 2380, 2375, or OPORD 2380 Plus had mentioned the 10th Mountain Division transitioning to the 25th Infantry Division. While it is not unusual to have one division accept mission handover from another, it is curious that the 25th Infantry Division was never involved in the initial mission planning.[31]

What, then, can we conclude from Uphold Democracy and the U.S. Army's experience in Haiti? Above all, proximity guarantees that Haiti will remain a centerpiece for U.S. political concerns. As Dr. Bryant Freeman notes, Haiti always will be an American problem.[32] We can also deduce that Haiti, despite being a permanent American concern, is

not much better off now than it was before Uphold Democracy. Haiti remains an extremely poor country with a rigid class structure. Despite U.S. government claims of democratic success in Haiti, only 5 percent of the country's registered voters participated in the March 1997 elections. The low voter turnout could indicate that Haitians are dubious in their belief that democracy has been upheld and taken root. Furthermore, after two U.S. military interventions this century, the Haitian masses are not better educated or trained to be self-sufficient. It appears that U.S. military forces have had little impact in changing Haitian attitudes and the established social order.

Militarily, Uphold Democracy can be viewed as both a success and a failure. To some, the U.S. Army was successful because the junta left, Aristide returned to the presidency, the FAd'H was disarmed, and the Haitian Police was vetted and retrained. In effect, the U.S. Army did a fairly good job of accomplishing the operational goals of establishing a secure and, at least temporarily, stable environment. The Army, however, failed to engage the Haitian population and influence lasting change. While the Haitians must eventually change themselves, U.S. conventional forces in Port-au-Prince failed to act as role models for affecting that change. Aside from what it did and did not do in Haiti, the U.S. Army will continue to be an active player, along with other U.S. agencies, in future peace operations. The Army has the experience and resources that many of the civilian agencies do not possess. They, in turn, have valuable competencies and legal obligations that are essential to the success of military operations. Continued and improved interagency cooperation is therefore essential to the success of future peace operations.

While the U.S. military took the lead in Uphold Democracy, that might not be the case in the future. As the military downsizes, certain members of the interagency might find themselves in command of a peace operation, with the U.S. Army only in a supporting role. Uphold Democracy at least can serve as an example of what happens when the Army, various government and nongovernment agencies, and private volunteer organizations are called upon to participate in a peace operation.

Uphold Democracy generated one major controversy concerning the appropriate force protection posture to assume in a peace operation. If the 10th Mountain Division leadership in Port-au-Prince was correct in believing that peace operations at the squad and platoon level required little more than combat techniques and activities, then that sends a clear message concerning how a conventional force participates in a peace

operation. On the other hand, if the SOF community was right, then that sends quite a different signal. What is clear is that, in future peace operations, both types of forces need to examine the nature of the conflict, appropriate missions, the necessary posture for force protection, and the way in which these considerations work to support or undermine U.S. political objectives.

Whether or not the Haitians will benefit from the latest intervention remains to be seen. The U.S. Army "intervasion" force in 1994, unlike the U.S. Marines in 1915, departed after six months, having handed the mission over to UNMIH. Similar to the 1915 occupation, the 1994 operation left a secure environment, as well as a partially repaired infrastructure. But in both cases, the Marines and the Army failed to train or educate the Haitians adequately in maintaining the country's stability and infrastructure. Nonetheless, both the Marine and Army operations created a legacy for the future. As with the Marines in 1915, the Army's involvement in Operation Uphold Democracy forged Haitian opinions of Americans by and large more favorable than ones left behind in 1934. Regardless of what Uphold Democracy did or did not do, the U.S. Army helped to create a Haitian viewpoint of America that will shape political relations between the two countries in the future.

Notes

Chapter 5

1. Lester D. Langley, *The Banana Wars, United States Intervention in the Caribbean 1898–1934* (Belmont, CA: Wadworth Publishing Company and the University of Kentucky Press, 1988), 2–6.

2. Hans Schmidt, *The United States Occupation of Haiti 1915–1934* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1995), x–xv.

3. Donald E. Schultz, *Whither Haiti?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1996), x.

4. Conversation with Lieutenant Colonel Russ Glenn, School of Advanced Military Studies, by Walter E. Kretchik, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

5. U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, March 23, 1994, defines each of the situations in the following manner. A hostile environment is an operational environment in which hostile forces have control and the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. An uncertain environment is defined as an operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended areas of operations. A permissive environment is an operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control and the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct. Key to all three environments is that the local government and its forces either control or fail to control their country.

6. Interview with Dr. Bryant Freeman and Lieutenant Colonel Tom Adams by Walter E. Kretchik, 1995, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, Haiti

Oral History Project (HOHP). Dr. Freeman is the director of the Institute of Haitian Studies, University of Kansas. He has authored over sixteen books on Haiti, written the only Haitian Creole-English dictionary in existence, and has lived and traveled in Haiti over the last thirty years.

7. Interview with Lieutenant Colonel Randall P. Munch by Major Christopher Clark, 44th Military History Detachment, 1995, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

8. According to joint doctrine, a permissive situation means that the host country military and law enforcement agencies are in control and have the intent and capability to assist operations that an outside unit intends to conduct. See Joint Pub 1-02, 275.

9. Ibid.

10. Conversation with Major Tom Ziek, JTF 190 historian by Walter E. Kretchik, September 1995, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

11. Interview with Colonel Andrew Berdy by Major Tom Ziek, October 9, 1994, Bowen Field, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

12. Interview with Colonel Thomas Miller by Major Christopher Clark, 44th Military History Detachment, date unknown, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

13. Berdy Interview.

14. Interview with Colonel Jim Dubik by Walter E. Kretchik, March 1995, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

15. Interview with U.S. Army Special Forces officer by Walter E. Kretchik, March 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

16. Interview with U.S. Army Military Intelligence officer by Walter E. Kretchik, April 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

17. Interviews and conversations with numerous officers by Walter E. Kretchik, November 1996–May 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP. According to numerous field grade officers from the 10th Mountain Division, both Major General David Meade, the division commander, and Brigadier General George Close, the

assistant division commander, exhibited leadership styles that were "trying." One officer witnessed a "screaming fit" by the division commander that was directed at two MPs who had temporarily removed their body armor while laboring in the sweltering 100 degree heat. A logistics officer saw a similar instance and remarked that "the entire chain of command just stood there and took it. Later, we wondered about it, was this leadership by screaming?" Lieutenant Colonel George Steuber, a key leader within Task Force Mountain, related that Brigadier General Close was a hard, but usually fair, individual. Steuber related that Close was also prone to rages where he would lose control of himself in front of subordinates to include throwing his helmet. According to Steuber, who personally was involved in one such instance, Close had earned his nickname "Danger Close," a term usually identified with firing artillery or using air strikes near or upon ones own position. Steuber also noted that Meade would treat his subordinates in a like fashion, but that Close would sometimes apologize afterwards.

18. Interviews with U.S. Army Special Forces and Civil Affairs officer by Walter E. Kretchik, February–April, 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP. An example of directed nonengagement was Brigadier General Close's orders to Special Forces soldiers on the first day of the operation to not talk with Haitians through the fence at Port-au-Prince airport. According to one eye-witness, Close ordered him and several others away from the fence, thereby denying them access to the people. Although political considerations were possibly at stake as the junta and the FAd'H were cooperating with U.S. forces, SF soldiers were unaware that they could not meet and engage in conversation with the populace, normally a typical SF mission. Many SF soldiers later ignored the directive as it was in direct conflict with the orders they received through Special Operations Forces command channels.

19. Interview with Major Len Gaddis by Walter E. Kretchik, March 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

20. Conversation with 10th Mountain Division officer by Walter E. Kretchik, March 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

21. Conversation with Haitian scholar by Walter E. Kretchik, November 1996, Montrois, Haiti.

22. Miller Interview.

23. Ibid.

24. Conversations with numerous Haitian scholars by Walter E. Kretchik and Bob Baumann, November 1996, Montrois, Haiti. The conversations were with native Haitian scholars who had eye-witness experiences with U.S. troops. One Haitian described American soldiers as "sterile" in their approach toward Haitians. Another Haitian believed that the Americans did not interact with the population out of contempt, the same contempt that her father told her the U.S. Marines of the 1920s felt toward him. These comments, and others, indicate that the 10th Mountain Division did not present a totally positive image with the populace.

    Some observers noted that certain members of the XVIII Airborne Corps were frustrated with the 10th Mountain Division's initial operating methods in Haiti. To some XVIII Airborne staff officers, conservative decisions were overriding the accomplishment of political objectives. Major Tony Ladouceur, Shelton's personal translator, noted that Shelton stayed in Haiti a lot longer than he had planned because of concerns over 10th Mountain Division's operations. Ladouceur noted that Shelton voiced several concerns with Meade over operational command decisions, particularly over population engagement, and had personally tried to rectify the situation on several occasions without effect. Ladouceur's comments to the author were that Shelton remained in Haiti simply because he was not comfortable with how the 10th Mountain Division was conducting itself. He therefore stayed beyond his expected departure time to ensure that the division did what it was supposed to do.

25. Interview with Colonel Marc Boyatt by Walter E. Kretchik, March 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP.

26. Conversations with U.S. Army Special Forces soldiers by Walter E. Kretchik, November 1996–February 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS, HOHP. The Special Forces soldiers mentioned that Lieutenant General Shelton told his subordinates to really understand "street rhythms" to know what was happening on the streets of Haiti.

27. Miller Interview.

28. Interview with Brigadier General Richard Potter by Major Christopher Clark, 44th Military History Detachment, October 23, 1994, Port-au-Prince, Haiti.

29. Conversations with members of the FORSCOM staff by Walter E. Kretchik, November 1996 and April 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

30. Conversations with several members of the 25th Infantry Division and 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment staffs by Walter E. Kretchik, November 1996, December 1996, and February 1997, Ft. Leavenworth, KS.

31. Lieutenant General Shelton, upon his return to Ft. Bragg, was promoted to general and given command of the U.S. Special Operations Command. Major General Meade retired.

32. Freeman Interview.